Common to different versions of social constructionism is the definition of
discourse as taking place between persons. Experiences that take place in
the absence of immediate others, such as thinking to oneself or reading a t
ext, are treated as secondary phenomena, as introjected versions of social
utterances/gestures. This article asserts that representative constructioni
st articulations of between-person relationality rest on abstractions maski
ng a more primary locus of sociality. I offer an alternative formulation of
the social as the embodiment of Sensate experience, borrowing from Merleau
-Ponty's and Gendlin's accounts. Sensate experience is already radically re
lational before and beyond any notion of sociality as between-person voices
/gestures, generating more intimate and mobile possibilities of interperson
al understanding than are offered via discursive readings of terms like 'so
cial', 'language' and 'embodiment'.