A conceptual and empirical critique of Kemberg's influential object relatio
ns theory is presented as a case study of the limitations of structural ont
ological presuppositions in accounting for psychological processes. A summa
ry overview is provided of Kernberg's systems model, the process of interna
lization, his developmental stages, and his conception of the borderline pe
rsonality organization. Then a detailed critique considers: (1) the foundat
ions of Kernberg's model in affective memory and units of internalized obje
ct relations; (2) the principles of construction underlying his development
al processes; (3) the resulting product of these processes, his structural
model and theory of the borderline personality organization; and (4) the re
lationship between his metapsychology and his clinical theory. Suggestions
are made for how process models of personality and psychopathology can redr
ess the problems with structural accounts.