Legislative procedures in the European Union: An empirical analysis

The article analyses the role of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Co uncil in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union: co-oper ation and co-decision (I). We use the legislative history of some 5,000 par liamentary amendments. These procedures have been the subject of a great de al of theoretical debate. According to conventional wisdom the co-decision procedure increases the powers of the European Parliament. Revisionist appr oaches, however, suggest that the conditional agenda-setting powers accorde d to the Parliament by the co-operation procedure are more important than t he veto powers ascribed by co-decision. Our analysis demonstrates not only that both claims are correct, but also w hy. On the aggregate there is a higher success rate of parliamentary amendm ents under co-decision (I) than under co-operation, just as the data publis hed by the EP indicate. However, controlling for one of the conditions of c onditional agenda setting (agreement by the Commission under co-operation), conditional agenda setting empowers the EP more than veto powers. Finally, control of Commission behaviour in both procedures indicates no difference in acceptance rates between co-operation and co-decision. Our analysis explains why all three points above are true. The answer hinge s on the activity of the Commission, which was more hostile to parliamentar y amendments during the 1989-94 period (more amendments were rejected durin g this period than during any other period under both co-operation and co-d ecision). In addition, the power of the Commission has declined under co-de cision (because it can be and is more frequently overruled by the other two players, whether its opinion is positive or negative).