Mental accounting and other-regarding behavior: Evidence from the lab

This paper uncovers a key determinant of the other-regarding behavior that permeates bargaining experiments. Examining a one-shot dictator game that h as the first-mover dictate the split of an amount of money, dictators actin g over earned money exhibited self-interested behavior in 76% of bargains. This result stands in stark contrast to the baseline experiment in which di ctators acting over allocated money displayed self-interested behavior in o nly 26% of bargains. Self-interested behavior appeared at greater levels us ing an earnings protocol than any previous variation of the dictator game. While the distinction between earned and unearned wealth is likely context specific, the earnings protocol may be an important option for future labor atory research. Specifically, the earnings protocol may provide a closer co rrespondence between the laboratory and individual choices over personal as sets. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.