Many economists and biologists view cooperation as anomalous: animals (incl
uding humans) that pursue their own self-interest have superior survival od
ds to their altruistic or cooperative neighbors. However, in many situation
s there are substantial gains to the group that can achieve cooperation amo
ng its members, and to individuals who are members of those groups. For an
individual, the key to successful cooperation is the ability to identify co
operative partners. The ability to signal and detect the intention to coope
rate would be a very valuable skill for humans to posses.
Smiling is frequently observed in social interactions between humans, and m
ay be used as a signal of the intention to cooperate. However, given that h
umans have the ability to smile falsely, the ability to detect intentions m
ay go far beyond the ability to recognize a smile. In the present study, we
examine the value of a smile in a simple bargaining context. 120 subjects
participate in a laboratory experiment consisting of a simple two-person, o
ne-shot "trust" game with monetary payoffs. Each subject is shown a photogr
aph of his partner prior to the game; the photograph is taken from a collec
tion that includes one smiling and one non-smiling image for each of 60 ind
ividuals. These photographs are also rated by a separate set of subjects wh
o complete a semantic differential survey on affective and behavioral inter
pretations of the images.
Results lend some support to the prediction that smiles can elicit cooperat
ion among strangers in a one-shot interaction. Other characteristics of fac
es also appear to elicit cooperation. Factor analysis of the survey data re
veals an important factor, termed "cooperation", which is strongly related
to trusting behavior in the game. This factor is correlated with smiling, b
ut is somewhat more strongly predictive of behavior than a smile alone. In
addition, males are found to be more cooperative, especially towards female
images, whereas females are least cooperative towards female images. (C) 2
001 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.