Debates about commodification in bioethics frequently appeal to Kant's famo
us second formulation of the categorical imperative, the formula requiring
us to treat the rational (human) being as "an end in itself" and "never as
a means only." In the course of her own treatment of commodification, Marga
ret Jane Radin observes that Kant's application of this formula "does not g
enerate noncontroversial particular consequences." This is so, I argue, bec
ause Kant offers three different-and largely incompatible-interpretations o
f the formula. One focuses on the obligation to preserve rational willing;
the second stresses respect for human (physical) dignity and integrity; the
third views respect for others as "ends in themselves" as primarily involv
ing a willingness to govern one's conduct by a procedure of impartial co-le
gislation. Only the third of these interpretations, I conclude, offers a re
asonable and coherent approach to moral judgment about the limits of commod
ification.