Advances in electronic communications technology promise to invigorate shar
eholder voting as a viable tool for corporate governance, for example by de
creasing the cost, and thereby increasing the frequency and effectiveness,
of proxy fights. Increased use of shareholder voting, though, forces renewe
d focus on issues related to the shareholder voting process. One such issue
is vote-buying. Traditionally, courts have treated vote-buying in the corp
orate context as per se illegal. More recently, however, courts have relaxe
d their attitude toward such transactions, a move generally applauded by co
mmentators. This article argues that the newfound judicial acceptance of vo
te-buying is problematic, at least for publicly-held corporations. The arti
cle examines the reasons offered in support of vote-buying in such corporat
ions, and suggests that the same benefits could be obtained, without the th
reat of harm presented by vote-buying, through the use of turnout payments
to encourage shareholder participation in corporate voting contests. With r
egard to closely-held corporations, however, the article argues that vote-b
uying serves a useful preference aggregation function and generally should
be permitted.