This article draws an analytical distinction between two types of market un
certainty: egocentric, which refers to a focal actor's uncertainty regardin
g the best way to convert a set of inputs to an output desired by a potenti
al exchange partner, and altercentric, which denotes the uncertainty confro
nted by a focal actor's exchange partners regarding the quality of the outp
ut that the focal actor brings to the market. Given this distinction, the a
rticle considers how the value of "structural holes" and market status vary
with these two types of uncertainty. The article proposes that the value o
f structural holes increases with egocentric uncertainty, but not with alte
rcentric uncertainty. In contrast, the value of status increases with alter
centric uncertainty, but declines with egocentric uncertainty. Thus actors
with networks rich in structural holes should sort into markets or market s
egments that are high in egocentric uncertainty; high-status actors should
sort into markets that are low in egocentric uncertainty. Support for this
claim is found in an examination of the venture capital markets.