Decision making and memory: A critique of Juslin and Olsson's (1997) sampling model of sensory discrimination

P. Juslin and H. Olsson's (1997) distinction between Thurstonian and Brunsw ikian uncertainty is examined and their sampling model of sensory discrimin ation analyzed as a representative of the class of memoryless decision proc esses. The separate characteristics and combined behavior of 4 main compone nts of the model are explored: (a) the basic decision process, (b) the assu mption of deadline responding, (c) the moving window model of memory, and ( d) the hypothesized basis for confidence. It is argued that grafting a movi ng window memory onto a memoryless decision process has several undesirable consequences. Moreover, the suggested basis for confidence leads to predic tions that are counterintuitive and unsupported by empirical evidence. It i s concluded that the window-sampling model is a maladapted combination of i nappropriate elements, which is implausible as a model of decision making, memory, or confidence, in sensory discrimination.