The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach tomoral judgment

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in whi ch moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gi ves 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc constru ction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individ uals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influence s. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in so cial, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anth ropology and primatology.