Judgmental errors, interactive norms, and the difficulty of detecting strategic surprises

The concept of strategic surprise has been used by writers on military stra tegy to explore the successful amplification of resources during battle. Th is paper applies the same concept to subcontracting relationships and devel ops a cognitive framework to explain the phenomenon of strategic surprises, using buyer-supplier relations as an example. We first examine the factors that produce vulnerability to strategic surprise in cooperative situations . Then, we explore the reasons why firms are caught by surprise in spite of their vigilance. We present a model representing false alarms and strategi c surprises as judgmental errors. We argue that judgmental errors cause mis interpretation of evidence and a consequent sense of false security. Intera ctive norms, which exist in some industries and may be taken as proxies for enduring relationships, may increase the likelihood of misjudgment and str ategic surprises.