Jury nullification occurs when jurors intentionally disregard the law in re
turning a verdict. The phenomenon has attracted a great deal of scholarly a
ttention, though almost exclusively in connection with criminal trials. Ind
eed, some commentators have taken the position that civil juries cannot nul
lify. In contrast to verdicts Of acquittal, trial and appellate judges do h
ave the power to intercede in civil cases, but in practice they may find it
difficult to discern and correct instances of intentional jury departures
from their instructions. Although it is hard to document cases of civil jur
y nullification, it is also not clear how often criminal juries engage in a
cts of nullification. The lack of evidence confirming the descriptive claim
has not, however, discouraged scholars from evaluating the merits of crimi
nal jury nullification.
This Article canvasses the extensive debate over criminal jury nullificatio
n as a prelude to considering the possible arguments for and against its co
unterpart in civil litigation. Although a number of commentators have prais
ed certain aspects of jury departures from the law in the latter context, t
he case in favor of civil jury nullification is much weaker than it is in t
he criminal arena. Concerns about protecting citizens against oppressive go
vernment action do not arise in lawsuits between private parties. Beneficia
ries of nullification may applaud the jury's function in softening the appl
ication of seemingly harsh rules, but their adversaries will voice legitima
te complaints that nullification sacrifices their due process fights. In ad
dition, when a jury chooses to disregard laws adopted by legislatures or co
urts, it undemocratically usurps the lawmaking function lodged in those ins
titutions. Thus, courts should more readily embrace tools such as special v
erdicts and bifurcation of trials in order to minimize the risks that civil
juries will deviate from their instructions.