Priming exceptions: A test of the scope hypothesis in naturalistic trait judgments

Trait judgments draw on two kinds of memory: (a) trait summaries, which pro vide information in the form of a generalization, and (b) memories of episo des in which a person behaved in ways that are relevant to the trait. Accor ding to the scope hypothesis (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Klein, Cosmides , Tooby, & Chance, in press), a trait summary is most useful when its scope is delimited (i.e., when it is accompanied by information specifying those situations in which it does not apply). Episodic memories that are inconsi stent with a trait summary can serve this function, because they encode spe cific situations in which the generalization fails to predict the outcome. This suggests that judgment procedures should be designed to search for sum mary information in semantic memory and, upon retrieving it, also search fo r episodic memories that are inconsistent with that summary. This predictio n has been tested and supported in previous experiments using artificial ta rget persons (Babey, Queller, & Klein, 1998). Herein, we present the findin gs from two experiments supporting this prediction using trait judgments ab out real people for whom subjects have real world knowledge: the self (Expe riment 1) and one's mother (Experiment 2). The experiments also test a subt le prediction of the scope hypothesis: that a trait summary must exist and be retrieved for trait-inconsistent episodes to be primed. The results show that in the absence of a trait summary, trait-inconsistent episodes are no t primed, but trait-consistent ones are.