A traditional view of perception and action makes two assumptions: that the
causal flow between perception and action is primarily linear or one-way,
and that they are merely instrumentally related to each other, so that each
is a means to the other. Either or both of these assumptions can be reject
ed. Behaviorism rejects the instrumental but not the one-way aspect of the
traditional view, thus leaving itself open to charges of verificationism. E
cological views reject the one-way aspect but not the instrumental aspect o
f the traditional view, so that perception and action are seen as instrumen
tally interdependent. It is argued here that a better alternative is to rej
ect both assumptions, resulting in a two-level interdependence view in whic
h perception and action co-depend on dynamically circular subpersonal relat
ions and as a result may be more than merely instrumentally interdependent.
This is illustrated by reference to motor theories of perception and contr
ol theories of action.