The emergence of jurisdictional resequencing in the federal courts

The Supreme Court recently held that federal courts may address personal ju risdiction, and dismiss a lawsuit for its absence, without first or ever ve rifying their subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court's ruling effectively i nvites lower courts to sidestep subject-matter jurisdictional issues and di spose of lawsuits on any non-merits threshold ground that is functionally e quivalent to, but more easily resolved than, the question of subject-matter jurisdiction. In this Article, Professor Idleman examines the genealogy, c omponents, legitimacy, and future application of this emerging doctrine of resequencing, as well as the extent to which it accords with the Court's pr ofessedly restrained approach to federal power. Professor Idleman contends that the doctrine represents an unsettling departure from both precedent an d jurisdictional theory, including principles of inherent judicial power. M oreover, the doctrine's elements and scope are neither carefully delineated nor grounded in a coherent theory of judicial power, a reality that has al ready spawned several lower court conflicts. Notwithstanding these difficul ties, the Article attempts to assess the potential resequencibility of vari ous threshold issues, most notably personal jurisdiction, Eleventh Amendmen t immunity, and federal sovereign immunity. Professor Idleman concludes tha t despite the potential appeal of the resequencing doctrine, its jurisprude ntial flaws overshadow its practical benefits.