Gillett argues that there are unexpected confluences between the tradition
of Frege and Wittgenstein and that of Freud and Lacan. I counter that that
the substance of the exegeses of Frege and Wittgenstein in Gillett's paper
are flawed, and that these mistakes in turn tellingly point to unclarities
in the Lacanian picture of language, unclarities left unresolved by Gillett
. Lacan on language is simply a kind of enlarged/distorted mirror image of
the Anglo-American psychosemanticists: where they emphasize information and
representation, he emphasizes evocation and connotation. Neither contrasti
ng emphasis is remotely adequate to linguistic action-in-the-world. Is "the
unconscious", as Lacan claims, a "network of signifiers"? Arguably, yes; b
ut most ordinary/actual language does not involve such "signification". Wor
ds primarily "signify" concepts or things only in exceptional circumstances
; normally, words are transparent, and nothing at all is meant by them exce
pt in an actual situation of use of a sentence. Second, is "the unconscious
" structured like a language? Again, yes-if we understand by "language" wha
t Lacan asks us to. "The unconscious" arguably is structured like a languag
e-as Lacan (inadequately) understands language.