A SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTION OF ANIMAL-WELFARE THAT REFLECTS ETHICAL CONCERNS

Scientific research on 'animal welfare' began because of ethical conce rns over the quality of life of animals, and the public looks to anima l welfare research for guidance regarding these concerns. The concepti on of animal welfare used by scientists must relate closely to these e thical concerns if the orientation of the research and the interpretat ion of the findings is to address them successfully. At least three ov erlapping ethical concerns are commonly expressed regarding the qualit y of life of animals: (1) that animals should lead natural lives throu gh the development and use of their natural adaptations and capabiliti es, (2) that animals should feel well by being free from prolonged and intense fear, pain, and other negative states, and by experiencing no rmal pleasures, and (3) that animals should function well, in the sens e of satisfactory health, growth and normal functioning of physiologic al and behavioural systems. Various scientists have proposed restricte d conceptions of animal welfare that relate to only one or other of th ese three concerns. Some such conceptions are based on value positions about what is truly important for the quality of life of animals or a bout the nature of human responsibility for animals in their care. Oth ers are operational claims: (1) that animal welfare research must focu s on the functioning of animals because subjective experiences fall ou tside the realm of scientific enquiry, or (2) that studying the functi oning of animals is sufficient because subjective experiences and func tioning are closely correlated. We argue that none of these positions provides fully satisfactory guidance for animal welfare research. We s uggest instead that ethical concerns about the quality of life of anim als can be better captured by recognizing three classes of problems th at may arise when the adaptations possessed by an animal do not fully correspond to the challenges posed by its current environment. (1) If animals possess adaptations that no longer serve a significant functio n in the new environment, then unpleasant subjective experiences may a rise, yet these may not be accompanied by significant disruption to bi ological functioning. Thus, a bucket-fed calf may experience a strong, frustrated desire to suck, even though it obtains adequate milk. (2) If the environment poses challenges for which the animal has no corres ponding adaptation, then functional problems may arise, yet these may not be accompanied by significant effects on subjective feelings. Thus , a pig breathing polluted air may develop lung damage without appeari ng to notice or mind the problem. (3) Where animals have adaptations c orresponding to the kinds of environmental challenges they face, probl ems may still arise if the adaptations prove inadequate. For example, an animal's thermoregulatory adaptations may be insufficient in a very cold environment such that the animal both feels poorly and functions poorly. We propose that all three types of problems are causes of eth ical concern over the quality, of life of animals and that they togeth er define the subject matter of animal welfare science.