Russia's array of political parties, based largely on Moscow-centered perso
nalities with presidential aspirations rather than coherent policy programs
, continued its seemingly directionless evolution in 1999 with the appearan
ce of two new 'parties'-Otechestvo and Edinstvo-each designed primarily to
facilitate presidential aspirations. In contrast and despite wrenching econ
omic changes, Russia from 1991 through 1996, at least, offers the picture o
f a surprisingly stable electorate in which the flow of votes across electi
ons from one party or candidate to the next follows a coherent and not alto
gether unpredictable pattern. Aggregate election returns suggests that this
pattern persisted through the 1999 Duma balloting to the 2000 presidential
election. The KPRF, as well as Yabloko, won nearly as many votes in 1999 a
s in 1996, while the votes lost by Our Home Is Russia, the LDPR, Lebed's al
lies in 1996, and a bevy of other small and not altogether anti-reform part
ies nearly account for Otechestvo and Edinstvo totals. Here, however, we of
fer a close examination of official rayon-level election returns from both
1999 and 2000 and conclude that this picture of stability masks the importa
nce we ought to attribute to the influence of regional governors and their
abilities to direct the votes of their electorates in a nearly wholesale fa
shion. We argue, moreover, that this conclusion is important to the matter
of reforming Russia's institutions so as to encourage a coherent party syst
em. Specifically, rather than focus on electoral institutional reform, we a
rgue that the principal culprit in explaining the failure of a coherent par
ty system to materialize is the influence of Russia's super-presidentialism
. (C) 2001 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd on behalf of The Regents of th
e University of California.