Attracting trouble - Democracy, leadership tenure, and the targeting of militarized challenges, 1918-1992

Otherwise powerful, formidable democracies are tempting targets for interna tional violence because they have leaders who, on average, have been in off ice for shorter periods of time than leaders of autocracies. Domestic incen tives may make resistance more costly than offering concessions for inexper ienced leaders of both democratic and authoritarian states. Overtime, howev er, resistance may become domestically less costly, causing experienced lea ders to be more likely to prefer resistance. Anticipating this response, po tential challengers may be more likely to target inexperienced leaders. Bec ause democracies generally have high rates of leadership turnover, they are tempting targets for international violence. Statistical analysis of crisi s initiation between 1918 and 1992 confirms the perception that democracies are more likely to be targets of militarized challenges. Results are also consistent with the proposition that the relatively short tenure in office served by democratic leaders helps to account for the observed pattern of d emocratic attraction of foreign challenges.