A puzzle about Hobbes on self-defense

The crucial step in Hobbes' argument for the right of self-defense in civil society is the claim that the parties to the Covenant for the establishmen t of civil society do not abandon the right when they agree to lay down a p ortion of their natural rights. The reason they do not abandon this right i s that it is not to their benefit to do so. But there seem to be many situa tions in which a person would benefit by abandoning the right of self-defen se. I consider several interpretations that would rescue Hobbes' argument o n this point. It turns out that the argument Hobbes needs to defend his app eal to benefit relies on a straightforward maximizing conception of rationa lity. I argue, however, that the account of rationality Hobbes presupposes in his answer to the infamous Foole is altogether different: it is a pragma tic theory of rationality instead. I argue that as between his argument for the inalienability of self-defense and his argument against free-riding on the Social Contract, Hobbes has no choice but to side with the latter. I a lso suggest, however, that Hobbes might have argued for the existence of a right of self-defense by a somewhat different rout than the one he took. Th e reconstructed argument I propose depends upon a particular understanding of the right of self-defense in Hobbes' system: It regards the right as the central political protection parties to the Covenant might regard themselv es as having against the usurpations of an all-powerful sovereign.