The provision of subsidized child care has grown to become a sizeable econo
mic activity in Sweden during recent decades. This paper examines the chang
ed financial relation between central and local governments and the impact
of child-care grants on local government behaviour. We find that during an
earlier regime, with a system of matching grants, local governments respond
ed strongly to the incentives of the rules. This resulted in both intended
and unintended outcomes, as well as a distortion of information to the cent
ral government. Experiences from a recent transition of regime towards a ki
nd of closed block grant system, illustrates new types of adaptive behaviou
r but also the problem of finding a formula for a fair allocation of resour
ces among local governments. When designing a block grant system a distinct
ion must be made between expenditures and resource needs; cost expenditure
data do not necessarily reflect resource needs in cases where there are nat
ional categorical equity goals related to social services of a merit-want c
haracter.