Does direct democracy reduce public debt? Evidence from Swiss municipalities

Citation
Lp. Feld et G. Kirchgassner, Does direct democracy reduce public debt? Evidence from Swiss municipalities, PUBL CHOICE, 109(3-4), 2001, pp. 347-370
Citations number
65
Categorie Soggetti
Politucal Science & public Administration
Journal title
PUBLIC CHOICE
ISSN journal
00485829 → ACNP
Volume
109
Issue
3-4
Year of publication
2001
Pages
347 - 370
Database
ISI
SICI code
0048-5829(200112)109:3-4<347:DDDRPD>2.0.ZU;2-R
Abstract
Although some countries have managed to obtain balanced budgets or even bud get surpluses in recent times, public debts of many OECD countries remain a t high levels. Since structural reforms of public spending have only infreq uently taken place in most countries, fiscal pressure will increase again i n the future due to society's ageing and the accompanying increases in soci al transfer spending. Constitutional restrictions on debt levels and legal rules of the budgetary process, such as a strong role of the minister of fi nance, are supposed to be helping against the debt bias inherent in politic al decision-making procedures. In addition to such top down budgetary proce dures, this paper investigates the impact of referendum approval of budget deficits by the voters on the level of public debt in a cross section of th e 134 largest Swiss municipalities in 1990.