Quantification, mandated science and judgment

In his Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public L ife, Ted Porter asks how to account for the prestige and power of quantitat ive methods in the modern world. His answer involves two theses. One revers es a standard claim by asserting that quantification in basic sciences can often be driven by quantification in more applied areas such as government and business. The second thesis, which I call judgment replacement, asserts that quantification overcomes lack of trust in humans by replacing human j udgment in scientific communities and public life. Some aspects of the latt er thesis are insightful and convincing. However, as a general claim, the j udgment replacement thesis says that quantification and objectivity imply s hallowness, superficiality and lack of subtlety. I examine one of Porter's key examples and show that as a general proposition the judgment replacemen t thesis gives a warped account of governmental decisions that involve a gr eat deal of scientific input, an activity that colleagues and I have called mandated science. I show that Porter obfuscates the very features of manda ted science that need the most clarification. The quantitative mentality ca n be superficial but it can also be complex and profound, and quantificatio n can actually increase human judgment. The virtues of quantitative methods help account for their prestige and power. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.