How an ideologically concentrated minority can trump a dispersed majority:Nonmedian voter results for plurality, run-off, and sequential eliminationelections

In contrast to Downs' (1957) median voter result for two-candidate election s, we should not expect multicandidate elections to produce outcomes around the median, even on average. Rather the winning candidate will tend to be between the median voter and the mode. This is true whether we consider plu rality, run-off, or sequential elimination elections, and whether or not th e electorate is divided into factions that control the nomination of candid ates. For an unfactionalized electorate, computer simulation with randomly positi oned candidates is used to model various electoral systems. This is because no equilibrium solution exists for this case. For a factionalized electora te, a game-theoretic model of faction formation is used. The results suggest that an ideologically cohesive minority around the mode of the population distribution may have a disproportionate influence on th e outcome. These results can be applied to party leadership in the U.S. Hou se, following Grofman, Koetzle, and McGann (forthcoming).