Using a theoretical approach based on random processes, signal processing,
and information theory. we study the performance of digital watermarks subj
ected to an attack consisting of linear shift-invariant filtering and addit
ive colored Gaussian noise. Watermarking is viewed as communication over a
hostile channel, where the attack takes place. The attacker attempts to min
imize the channel capacity under a constraint on the attack distortion (dis
tortion of the attacked signal), and the owner attempts to maximize the cap
acity under a constraint on the embedding distortion (distortion of the wat
ermarked signal). The distortion measure is frequency-weighted mean-squared
error (MSE). In a conventional additive-noise channel, communication is mo
st difficult when the noise is white and Gaussian, so we first investigate
an effective white-noise attack based on this principle, We then consider t
he problem of resisting this attack and show that capacity is maximized whe
n a power-spectrum condition (PSC) is fulfilled. The PSC states that the po
wer spectrum of the watermark should be directly proportional to that of th
e original signal. However, unlike a conventional channel, the hostile atta
ck channel adapts to the watermark, not vice versa. Hence, the effective wh
ite-noise attack is suboptimal, We derive the optimum attack. which minimiz
es the channel capacity for a given attack distortion. The attack can be ro
ughly characterized by a rule-of-thumb: At low attack distortions, it adds
noise, and at high attack distortions. it discards frequency components. Ag
ainst the optimum attack, the PSC does not maximize capacity at all attack
distortions. Also, there is no unique watermark power spectrum that maximiz
es capacity over the entire range of attack distortions. To find the waterm
ark power spectrum that maximizes capacity against the optimum attack, we a
pply iterative numerical methods, which alternately adjust the watermark po
wer spectrum and re-optimize the parameters of the optimum attack. Experime
nts using ordinary MSE distortion lead to a rule-of-thumb: White watermarks
perform nearly optimally at low attack distortions, while PSC-compliant wa
termarks perform nearly optimally at high attack distortions. The effect of
interference from the original signal in suboptimal blind watermarking sch
emes is also considered; experiments examine its influence on the optimized
watermark power spectra and the potential increase in capacity when it can
be partially suppressed. Additional experiments demonstrate the importance
of memory. and compare the optimum attack with suboptimal attack models. F
inally, the rule-of-thumb for the defense is extended to the case of freque
ncy-weighted MSE as a distortion measure. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. Al
l rights reserved.