Interpreting Berlin's liberalism

I argue that Isaiah Ber lin's pluralistic liberalism is best interpreted as a sophisticated form of liberal rationalism, as Berlin himself suggests. H is value pluralism, even if it is viewed las his critics typically view it, with considerable justification) as claiming that any choice between confl icting incommensurable values cannot be a rational choice, does not subvert his liberalism. Rather, this agonistic pluralism emanates from his liberal rationalism, which pictures reason as too weak to resolve conflicts of inc ommensurables. Yet, reason remains strong enough to discover that certain b asic liberal values, including those associated with some minimum core of e qual rights, are far more important than any competing values created by ma nkind. Berlin apparently sees his pluralistic liberal rationalism as a genu ine rationalism that, in stark contrast to mainstream utopian rationalisms which wildly exaggerate the power of reason makes suitable room for the val id insights provided by the romantics.