The role of the audit committee in corporate governance is the subject of i
ncreasing public and regulatory interest. We focus on one frequently noted
function of the audit committee: auditor selection. We argue that independe
nt and active audit committee members demand a high level of audit quality
because of concerns about monetary or reputational losses that may result f
rom lawsuits or SEC sanction. Auditors who specialize in the client's indus
try are expected to provide a higher level of audit quality than do nonspec
ialists. Thus, we predict that firms with audit committees that are both in
dependent and active are more likely to employ an industry-specialist audit
or.
We find that firms with audit committees that do not include employees and
that meet at least twice per year are more likely to use specialists. This
study contributes to our understanding of audit committee functions and pro
vides evidence that industry specialization is an important element of audi
tor selection.