The political context of issue-priority voting: coalitions and economic voting in the Netherlands, 1970-1999

Issue-priority models are the principal alternatives to reward-punishment o r incumbency-oriented models of the political economy of party support. A f ocus on the political context clarifies some conceptual difficulties with i ssue-priority voting. We emphasize the implications of multi-party system a nd coalition government. A case study is presented on how economic factors have affected party popularity in the Netherlands between 1970 and 1999. Co alitions have not rendered issue-priority voting infeasible because (1) vot ers possess necessary basic information, (2) they have indentifiable percep tions about party issue priority, and (3) they have reasonable expectations about the relation between electoral outcomes and possible coalitions. Sur vey data and time-series analyses provide support for the idea that issue-p riority voting is conditional on perceptions of competency and coalition st ructure. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.