Cournot was a mathematician and a philosopher: his contribution to the theo
ry of probability is however rather more philosophical. It deals with the f
oundations and the range of the theory. He addressed the question of the ex
tent to which probability may be applied to things themselves, or only to k
nowledge of them.
The author of this article examines Cournot's conception of the relationshi
p between science and philosophy and his view of the statute of the theory
of probability as a part of mathematics. The author further looks into Cour
not's evidence for the objective existence of chance as a meeting of indepe
ndent causal chains, and his analysis of the principle of physical impossib
ility. Cournot's analysis does not conclude with the solution of the issue
of,the objective or subjective value of probability, nor with the endorseme
nt of one or another one-sided position. Rather it points to the necessity
of allowing for the duality of their meanings and the recognition of the re
al value that may be ascribed to probability when it is applied.
In conclusion the author assesses Cournot's place in the history of researc
h on mathematical probability: Cournot occupies a position between the phas
e of the formation of the theory and the present.