Cartesian physics in the light of Husserl's phenomenology

Historians of science interpret Cartesian physics as being either a complet ely misguided theory, or at best a coherent metaphysical system. For this r eason, its significance for the emergence of modern science is usually marg inalized. The aim of this paper is to question this evaluation. The author intends to demonstrate that despite the many practical errors and the clear ly metaphysical ideas present in Cartesian physics, the theory is indeed a scientific one, and it was of decisive importance for the emergence of Mode rn Age science. The author's view is based on the intentional interpretatio n of the emergence of modem science as a programme for the mathematization of nature, which Husserl put forth in his Krisis. The author attempts to sh ow that Cartesian physics were not metaphysical physics, but rather mathema tical physics, even despite the verbal means of presentation. Thus this the ory represented a transitional stage in the process of the idealization of nature, a bridge between Galileo and Newton.