THE SELF-REFUTING PARADOX AND THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT

Modernity and postmodernity have formed an important framework for deb ate in sociological theory. The often confrontational nature of the de bate has obscured key conclusions but these can be outlined by conside ring an argument often used by modernists against postmodernists, call ed the self-refuting paradox. This argument takes the form 'the claim that there is no such thing as the Rational is itself a rational claim and so refutes itself'. First, the notions of self-refutation and sel f-reference are separated. It is then noted that the result of the sel f-refuting paradox is neither the loss of modernity's key categories, as claimed by postmodernists, or the failure of the postmodern project , as claimed by modernists. Instead, both sides are shown to succeed a nd fail; forms of legitimation that previously underlay modernity's th ought fail and the strong forms of postmodern claims, such as there ar e no universals, also fail. The result of this analysis is that attent ion should be paid to the nature of universals, truths and norms, rath er than disputing their existence. These arguments are pursued first a t a general level and then in relation to the three key concepts of di fference, truth and universality.