THE MISUNDERSTOOD ALLIANCE BETWEEN SPORTS FANS, PLAYERS, AND THE ANTITRUST-LAWS

The baseball strike and the ongoing hostilities between the players' a ssociation and owners have evoked criticism and frustration among fans and others. Although the players successfully defeated the owners' mo st recent attempts to reduce major league competition, the threat of f uture imposition of competitive restraints by the owners remains. In t his article, Professor Stephen F. Ross argues that blanket restraints on the market for players affirmatively inhibit on-the-field competiti on and consequently offend the Sherman Act. The article begins with th e proposition that monopsony-price-fixing behavior by buyers', rather than sellers', cartels-implicates the Sherman Act. Restraints on compe tition for players' services are thus not exempt from the antitrust la ws. As the author notes, restraints of trade imposed by sports leagues are subject to antitrust scrutiny under a rule of reason: under the s tandard set forth in NCAA v. Board of Regents, such restraints are per missible where reasonably tailored to promote competitive balance. Pro fessor Ross then applies the NCAA standard to blanket restraints impos ed by sports leagues. He first demonstrates that the waiver rule emplo yed by some leagues is tailored to promote league competition, because it allows inferior teams with large payrolls to rapidly improve in th e standings by acquiring superior players. To counter the owners' argu ments that restraints such as salary caps are necessary to maintain le ague competition, Professor Ross relies on empirical evidence of the e ffect of these restraints on competitive balance and demonstrates that , in addition to not promoting competition, blanket restraints affirma tively harm competitive balance. Salary caps, the author argues, not o nly transfer wealth from players to owners, but facilitate bland, unin teresting seasons in which the same teams have consistently good or ba d win-loss records. The article includes a discussion of less restrict ive means of promoting competitive balance, including revenue sharing and progressive salary caps, which might pass antitrust muster. Profes sor Ross concludes that free competition in the player market protects the interests of both fans and players, such that an alliance of cons umers and players might be an effective way to combat the threat to ba seball which blanket restraints may pose in the future.