Prospect's theory's S-shaped weighting function is often said to reflect th
e psychophysics of chance. we propose an effective rather than psychophysic
al deconstruction of the weighting function resting on two assumptions. Fir
st, preferences depend on the affective reactions associated with potential
outcomes of a risky choice. Second, even with monetary values controlled s
ome outcomes are relatively affect-poor. Although the psychophysical and af
fective approaches are complementary, the affective approach has one novel
implication. Weighting functions will be more S-shaped for lotteries involv
ing affect-rich than affect-poor outcomes. That is, people will be more sen
sitive to departures from impossibility and certainty but less sensitive to
intermediate probability variations for affect-rich outcomes. We corrobora
ted this prediction by observing outcome probability interactions: An affec
t poor prize was preferred over an affect-rich prize under certainty, but t
he direction of preference reversed under low-probability. We suggest that
the assumption of probability outcome independence, adopted both by both ex
pected-utility and prospect theory, ay hold across outcomes of different mo
netary values, but not different affective values.