This article outlines the effects of direct democracy on the Swiss politica
l system. It deals with referendums initiated by petition 'from below' and
with their indirect impact on politics and policy-making. Political elites
sought to craft integrative strategies in order to tame the conflictual pot
ential of these inherently majoritarian mechanisms. It is argued that this
adaptive behaviour took three forms, the first two aiming to prevent recour
se to direct democracy, and the last to steer the processes it engenders: w
idening the executive formula, to encompass all parties likely to make effi
cient use of the referendum if not co-opted as partners in the governing co
alition; anticipation of the veto risk by negotiating ex-ante with opponent
s to policy reforms that were triggered by government and parliament; ex-po
st negotiation when the use of direct democracy could not be prevented, as
in the case of popular initiatives. Finally, the limits of this neo-institu
tionalist approach are explored, before concluding with an assessment of th
e validity of the traditional functions of direct democracy today.