Government credible commitment to the French and American nuclear power industries

Backlash against nuclear power although widespread, affected nuclear pouter programs differently in the United States than in France owing to their di ffering institutional setups. This article uses a transaction costs economi cs approach to examine government credible commitment to the French and Ame rican nuclear power industries. Positive political theory sheds light on th e comparative institutional environment in each industry. The American comb ination of fragmented power little reliance on bureaucratic expertise, an i ndependent judiciary, and opposing interest groups greatly undermines the a bility of the U.S. government to credibly commit to the nuclear power indus try. In France, despite substantial anti-nuclear interest groups, the imper meability of the institutional setup - no division of power, weak judiciary , and reliance on bureaucratic expertise-effectively prevents activists fro m influencing policy outcomes. (C) 2001 by the Association for Public Polic y Analysis and Management.