All about words: Early understandings of the "judicial power" in statutoryinterpretation, 1776-1806

What understanding of the "judicial Power" would the Founders and their imm ediate successors possess in regard to statutory interpretation? In this Ar ticle, Professor Eskridge explores the background understanding of the judi ciary's role in the interpretation of legislative tests, and answers earlie r work by scholars like Professor John Manning who have suggested that the separation of powers adopted in the U.S. Constitution mandate an interpreti ve methodology similar to today's textualism. Reviewing sources such as Eng lish precedents, early state court practices, ratifying debates, and the Ma rshall Court's practices, Eskridge demonstrates that while early statutory interpretation began with the words of the text, it by no means confined it s search for meaning to the plain text. He concludes that the early pra esp ecially the methodology of John Marshall, provide a powerful model, not of an anticipatory textualism but rather of a sophisticated methodology that k nit together text, context, purpose, and democratic and constitutional norm s in the service of carrying out the judiciary's constitutional role.