Equilibrium selection in a merger game

Authors
Possajennikov, A
Citation
A. Possajennikov, Equilibrium selection in a merger game, ECON LETT, 72(2), 2001, pp. 255-261
Citations number
8
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ECONOMICS LETTERS
ISSN journal
01651765 → ACNP
Volume
72
Issue
2
Year of publication
2001
Pages
255 - 261
Database
ISI
SICI code
0165-1765(200108)72:2<255:ESIAMG>2.0.ZU;2-C
Abstract
A merger game is modeled as a non-cooperative simultaneous moves, exclusive membership game of coalition formation. In the three-player case in the eq uilibrium selected by refinements the merger is such that the participants prefer it to other mergers involving them. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. A ll rights reserved.