With the recent flurry of articles declaiming the death of the rational mar
ket hypothesis, it is well to pause and recall the very sound reasons this
hypothesis teas once so widely accepted, at least in academic circles. Alth
ough academic models often assume that all investors are rational, this ass
umption is clearly an expository device not to be taken seriously. What is
in contention is whether markets are "rational" in the sense that prices ar
e set as if all investors are rational. Even if markets ave not rational in
this sense, abnormal profit opportunities still may not exist. In that cas
e, markers may be said to be "minimally rational." I maintain that not only
ave developed financial markets minimally rational, they are, with two qua
lifications, rational. I contend that, realistically, market rationality ne
eds to be defined so as to allow investors to be uncertain about the charac
teristics of other investors in the market. I also argue that investor irra
tionality, to the extent that it effects prices, is particularly likely to
be manifest through overconfidence, which in turn, is likely to make the ma
rket "hyper-rational. " To illustrate, the article reexamines some of the m
ost serious historical evidence against market rationality.