M. Madrigal et Vh. Quintana, Existence and determination of competitive equilibrium in unit commitment power pool auctions: Price setting and scheduling alternatives, IEEE POW SY, 16(3), 2001, pp. 380-388
The existence, determination and effects of competitive market equilibrium
for unit commitment power pool auctions are investigated in this paper. Whe
n an equilibrium does not exist, under specific situations, conflictive mul
tiple optimal primal solutions may exist. When an equilibrium exists, multi
ple primal solutions do not represent conflicts of interest, The existence
or nonexistence of competitive equilibrium can be determined if the dual pr
oblem is solved to optimality, If equilibrium does not exist, there is exce
ss supply at the optimal dual solution, which can be used to define priorit
y orders and price setting alternatives to determine a final schedule, and
avoid the conflicts of interest and revenue deficiency. Under disequilibriu
m, the optimal dual variables are not market clearing prices; a nonuniform
pricing rule that avoids the flaws and complications of other pricing rules
, such as maximum average cost and price minimization auctions, is proposed
in the paper. The proposed scheduling and price-setting alternatives show
that unit commitment models can be used in a market environment.