Most contemporary discussions about pain take place within the framework of
materialistic theories. Their general point of departure is an attempt to
explain mental pain in terms of physical pain. In this article I address tw
o major problems, which materialistic theories deal with, from within a phe
nomenological perspective. The first problem is to find a physiological exp
lanation of pain that leaves space for mental pain experience. The second p
roblem, which I focus on, consists int he attempt to offer a description of
the physiological basis (which I call embodiment) of mental pain, which do
es not reduce the mental to the physical. I thereby present the thesis that
pain can be understood either as the body's revolt against the mind or the
mind's revolt against the body. With this thesis I want to show that pain
means a rupture which in a paradoxical way mediates to us an understanding
of the unity of body and mind. The purpose is to explain the meaning of pai
n, as a key to our understanding of our bodily existence.