COGNITIVE BIAS AND IRRATIONAL BELIEFS IN MAJOR DEPRESSION AND DYSPHORIA

Cognitive theories claim that depression is associated with irrational beliefs (Ellis, 1987) or biased inferential processes (Beck, 1987). D epressed (n = 24), dysphoric (n = 21), and nondepressed (n = 34) adult s completed self-reports of hopelessness, optimism, positive and negat ive affect and irrational beliefs. In an interview they gave an attrib ution, and a justification of the attribution, for each of six recent events. Consistent with Beck's theory and Cook and Peterson's (1986) d ata, depressed people were more biased in justifying negative-event at tributions. However they were less biased than the nondepressed in jus tifying positive-event attributions. Expected events yield less search for causes; attributions for them may thus be less logical Consistent with Ellis's theory, depressed people scored higher than the nondepre ssed on irrational beliefs, controlling for negative affect. Dysphoric people scored between the other groups on all measures.