Lake Tahoe's temporary development moratorium: Why a stitch in time shouldnot define the property interest in a takings claim

Defining the "property interest" at stake in takings claims presents an ong oing challenge for the courts. Judicial outcomes may vary depending on whet her a court adopts an expansive or fragmented view of the plaintiffs holdin gs. In Tahoe-Sierra, the Ninth Circuit soundly rejected the abstract splint ering of property interests known as "conceptual severance." The court refu sed to allow the plaintiffs to characterize their fee parcels as limited "s lices in time," thwarting their efforts to prove that ct 32-month developme nt moratorium had destroyed "all economically beneficial or productive use" of their land. This Note explores why the court's rejection of conceptual severance makes well-grounded contributions to takings law and public polic y. It also sets forth rationale for why temporary development moratoriums s hould not be equated with the "temporary takings" found deserving of compen sation. by the Supreme Court in First English.