To honor and obey: Efficiency, inequality, and patriarchal property rights

In this paper we use the logic of contractural relationships within the fam ily to explore how technological change, distributional struggle, and colle ctive action can help explain the relationship between economic development , fertility decline, and the emergence of more egalitarian marriages. We dr aw on the historical context of Great Britain and the U.S. between the seve nteenth and nineteenth centuries to argue that the property rights afforded male household heads constituted a system of residual claimancy not unlike modern contractual relationships with the capitalist firm. Based upon the patriarchal property rights, we present a simple model of household decisio n to allocate women's labor between productive and reproductive activities, comparing the outcomes of egalitarian and patriarchal governance and concl uding that patriarchal governance may create incentives for men to force wo men to "over-specialize" in reproductive labor.