The anticipated abatement costs to be incurred by Canada and six of its pro
vinces from the implementation of the Kyoto agreement (reduction of carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions generated by fossil fuel burning by 6% from 1990 le
vels) are estimated using an emissions benefit function. Marginal abatement
cost functions are estimated a,ld used for the analysis of alternative pol
icy enforcernelzt mechanisims. The efficiency of a policy mechanism depends
on the rule used to allocate the burden of the agreement among the provinc
es and on whether the provinces or the federal government implement the agr
eement at th provincial level. Under the rule of an equal emission reductio
n of 6% over 1990 levels in all provinces, Quebec bears no abatement costs
while British Columbia and Saskatchewan incur the highest costs. An allocat
ion rule based on the equimarginal principle achieves aggregate efficiency;
it is, however the rule that contains the risk of noncompliance by provinc
es that have already taken action toward emissions reduction.