Central bank independence and the value of ambiguity: a reputational game between a Central Bank, the government, and commercial banks.

Authors
Gangopadhayay, Partha Varoufakis, Yanis
Citation
Partha Gangopadhayay et Yanis Varoufakis, Central bank independence and the value of ambiguity: a reputational game between a Central Bank, the government, and commercial banks., Rivista internazionale di scienze economiche e commerciali mmerciali, 47(4), 2000, pp. 531-557
Journal title
Rivista internazionale di scienze economiche e commerciali mmerciali
ISSN journal
00356751 → ACNP
Volume
47
Issue
4
Year of publication
2000
Pages
531 - 557
Database
ESSPER
SICI code
0035-6751(2000)47:4<531:CBIATV>2.0.ZU;2-A