THE POSSIBILITY OF ETHICAL EXPERTISE

Can we legitimately speak of ethics experts? Recent literature in phil osophy and medical ethics addresses this important question but does n ot offer a satisfactory answer. Part of the problem is the absence of an examination of what it means to be an 'expert' in general. I theref ore begin by reviewing my analysis of expertise which appeared earlier in this journal. We speak of two kinds of experts: persons whose expe rtise is in virtue of what they know ('epistemic' expertise), or what they do ('performative' expertise). Applying this analysis to the doma in of ethics, I argue that we may speak of ethical expertise in three epistemic senses: a) expertise in descriptive ethics, b) expertise in metaethics, c) expertise in normative ethics, and in a performative se nse: d) expertise in living a good life. I conclude with a brief descr iption of some social roles of ethics experts.