DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION - COMPARATIVE RESPONSES TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY

In 1992 governments negotiated a multilateral treaty regime to manage biological diversity Unlike the United Kingdom, the United States reje cted this treaty. Yet both nations were equally at risk from biodivers ity loss and equally likely to benefit from its protection. This empir ical puzzle is used to explore state choice in regulatory cooperation. Epistemic community analysis helps to explain the onset of negotiatio ns and the contours of debates over regime norms and rules. But state choices, and the regime itself, primarily reflected the regulatory pol itics of biodiversity management. The international commitments on bio diversity, ostensibly alike for the U.K. and the U.S., had to be imple mented through their domestic regulatory structures; the result was a distinct set of domestic ramifications. Electoral incentives and espec ially domestic institutions influenced both industry and governmental assessments by shaping expectations about the impact of the regime in operation. As states increasingly seek to regulate internationally, do mestic institutions and anticipated implementation will play ever grea ter roles in explaining state choice and, because powerful states are equally influenced by these dynamics, in explaining international outc omes.