TRUTH-RATIOS, PROCESS, TASK, AND KNOWLEDGE

In this paper, I delineate two major problems facing reliabilist appro aches in epistemology. I argue that Alvin Goodman's (1986) position fa ils to solve either problem. I then suggest an alternative reliabilist approach that ties truth-ratio assessments to particular, well-specif ied cognitive tasks. I claim that a well-specified cognitive task is a n empirical hypothesis about a system that involves the specification of input and output types and nomic correlations (including statistica l correlations) that underlie the system's performance. On my approach , one characterizes processes by reference to the system's disposition s across the situations consistent with the task. Characterization is best understood as revealing a strategy or a set of strategies for gen erating outputs from inputs relying on certain nomic correlations asso ciated with the task.