INSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF THE EUROPEAN-UNION UNDER DEBATE

At the summit meeting of the Council of the European Union (EU) in Ams terdam in June 1997 it is hoped that a revised version of the Treaty o n European Union (TEU) will be presented and-such is the desire of a n umber of EU members states-adopted that also includes substantial refo rms in the institutional sphere. When the head of state and government leaders signed the treaty establishing the European Union in Maastric ht in February 1992 they expressed their desire in the preamble ''to e nhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institu tions so as to enable them better to carry out within a single institu tional framework, the tasks entrusted to them.'' Furthermore, they spe cified in Article N(2) that the institutional reform of the EU should itself be an object of reform. In view of the forthcoming enlargement rounds there was a general awareness that substantial reforms would be essential in a future EU with up to 24 members in order to ensure any ability to act effectively. Five years after the signing of the Treat y of Maastricht and shortly before the EU Council's Amsterdam summit p recisely those aspects relating to institutional reforms are the focus of controversy between the members of the EU. More specifically: the future relationship between and, the powers of the Council the Commiss ion and the Parliament, the question of the nature and procedure of de cision-making in the EU Council and in the Council of Ministers of the EU, and of making the EU more flexible. Carlo Masala, who is research ing on problems relating to EU integration at the Institut fuer Europa eische Politik und Wirtschaft of the University of Cologne, attempts t o clarify these questions in the following article.