D. Laming, A CRITIQUE OF A MEASUREMENT-THEORETIC CRITIQUE - COMMENTARY ON MICHELL, QUANTITATIVE SCIENCE AND THE DEFINITION OF MEASUREMENT IN PSYCHOLOGY, British journal of psychology, 88, 1997, pp. 389-391
Over the past 40 years there has been much theoretical progress in the
understanding of what it means to make measurements. If numbers are a
ssigned to objects. or events, the kinds of arithmetical operations (s
uch as averaging or calculating ratios) which it is thereafter meaning
ful to carry out on the numbers depend on the rule of assignment. Meas
urement theory, roughly speaking, is concerned to identify what condit
ions need to be satisfied to make this or that arithmetical operation
meaningful. Measurement theorists, generally, feel that psychologists
have disregarded their work, to tie detriment of the development of ps
ychology as a natural science. Michell's article is a polemic-a very s
cholarly and well-argued polemic-addressing this issue. It would have
helped his argument, however, to have explained why measurement theory
should matter to psychologists, and I endeavour, first of all, to rem
edy that deficit.